《黃昏四重奏(A Late Quartet)》

A Late Quartet International Poster
(來源:官網;公平使用/公平處理)

想講這部戲,但感到力有不逮

戲很好,這點毫無疑問;但整部戲其實以音樂、樂手、樂團作背景,貫穿整部戲的每個部份;不巧,我對音樂一竅不通,看戲的時候也只能隨便地:「嗯嗯嗯。」那樣照單全收,要去談論實在是做不到;雖然可以只談戲的部份,但實太可惜,不過也屬無可奈何。

四個主角是一隊已組成廿五年的弦樂四重奏(String Quartet)樂團,本應準備下一樂季的演出,但其大提琴手因病要離隊,就引爆本已存在的各種矛盾衝突。(今次維基的簡介少有地同樣簡短。)

演大提琴手的是Christopher Walken,如常地有型;戲份雖然不多,但又似乎處處感覺到其人、其角色的影響力;在關鍵的時候,發揮其壓場效果。

Christopher Walken的角色同時擔任解說。本片圍繞貝多芬的第十四號絃樂四重奏發展,以樂曲比喻人生、團隊/人際關係;又以各樂器擔當的角色,比喻四個樂手的個性和角色。

正是這一部份,我完全無法置喙,只有留白。
(或可如實引述戲中的說法:戲中形容,這首曲不容停頓稍息[不就像生活嗎?],但一直演奏下去,樂器總會走音脫線,樂手只有互相遷就、協調,以求奏完全曲。而關於四件樂器/四個樂手的關係,戲中如此解說:第一提琴,類近於領袖;第二提琴,調和、協調;其餘兩個,我聽不太懂。)

Philip Seymour Hoffman演第二提琴手,可以說他實際上是本片主角。這角色的故事其實頗為典型,但其精彩也在於此;典型的角色,其實多把握住一些人性共通的要點,我覺得在這部戲發揮得不錯。

為免透露劇情,只能說得隱晦籠統一點。

其實從「第二」提琴手這銜頭,已可看出角色端倪。這是一個渴求尊重、賞識的角色,這是有身份危機的角色。許是私心偏見,這是我最能認同投入的角色。在的士那一場戲,很精彩。

我相信是演化及基因使然,雄性是非常缺乏安全感的。這不安的感覺,竊以為源於生殖繁衍的角色,尤以胎生動物為甚。雌性很清楚自己母親的角色,子女的血緣也毫不含糊;雄性可沒有這優勢,對子女的血緣始終有一點懷疑。動物的成長期越長,養育子女的成本越大,如果要雄性肯投入資源,分擔此成本,則需要有點制度保障,但即使確立到制度,其信任基礎也很薄弱,這就是男性性格的根本。

信心稍有動搖,這制度即不能成立:所以雄性需要不停確認自己的角色、地位,以維持這脆弱的制度。

社會的地位當然重要,但在伴侶眼中的地位卻更重要。這就是我對這角色的解釋。

(這樣說起來,Philip Seymour Hoffman舊作《腦作大業(Synecdoche, New York》的角色也有這一面。)

其他角色,就不詳述了。

噢,不過要約略一提,演Philip Seymour Hoffman女兒的Imogen Poots很可愛。今次我不說「很萌」,因為不是那種類型,但很討喜。

==

簡單評分:

A(☆☆☆☆★)

A Late Quartet US Poster
(來源:官網;公平使用/公平處理)
美版海報型好多。

《非常盜(Now You See Me)》

Now You See Me Poster
(from Wikipedia;Fair Use/Fair Dealing)

有一段時間沒看過這麼精彩的電影。

噢!別誤會,這套戲:
絕對缺乏深度,不能刺激思考,沒有甚麼餘韻,角色平板淺薄,情節破綻不少。

不過,很精彩。

而無論如何,入場前切勿看劇情概要,會失色許多。例如維基的所謂簡介,實在詳盡得太過份,甚至揭破結局,入場前絕對絕對不要偷看。

回說這部片的影評,例如在爛蕃茄(Rotten Tomatoes)上的綜合評分,截至撰寫本文時,本片只得48分;而只計算所謂「top critics」,本片更只得26分!

余不敢苟同。

我似乎總喜歡跟影評人過不去,哈哈。這可不是有意的,但看法實在南轅北轍,也是無可奈何。簡閱那些影評,多是批評結局不完滿,很多謎團沒有解答,或是解答得草草了事,或謂情節破綻百出;這幾點其實沒有爭議,我是同意的。我不同意的,只是他們的結論。雖然結尾部份收束未如人意,但不能抹殺先前大部份的精彩,也不妨礙整部戲的觀感。我甚至斗膽說,不少劣評其實只是因為評論者不甘「受騙」、「受愚弄」。

我嘗試不透露任何劇情地解說一下。

今次,整部電影其實就是一套魔術表演。這一點,在戲中其實也沒有隱瞞過;另外,如果完場後回想,會發現有不少線索、提示,只不過在放映時觀眾沒有發現,或不想發現。如果看戲時不那麼投入,稍為抽離一點,很早就發現了。就像戲裡不停重複的說:「看不清楚,是因為你走得太近。」

但這樣有甚麼趣味!?

很多魔術,其實不是你想不到,而是你不想去想而已。觀眾是甘心受騙、甘心上當的,這就是趣味。觀眾在意的,是表演本身是否精彩。機關如何… 重要嗎?

(再重申一次。我甚至不是說結局的解釋很妥貼,這一點我也不滿,我也認為可以寫得更好,但這一點根本無礙我趣味盎然的看完整部戲!

有一類近身舞台魔術,魔術師會邀請一個(或幾個)人上台,表演近身魔術;而其中一部份賣點,是台下所有人都能看到那魔術手法的底蘊,但都會有默契,不向台上人點破。台上人被「愚弄」,是這種魔術的趣味之一。當然,「被愚弄」那一個也要夠風度,懂得欣賞這場表演才可以,否則就會鬧得氣氛很僵囉。我覺得不少劣評者正是那種「玩唔起」的人,不甘受擺弄。

其實有甚麼好怨憤的呢?如果不想玩這遊戲,不入場看這部片就可以了。

另外一些劣評理由,也是完全搞錯重點。例如:角色淺薄…

同上,理據我大致同意,我只是不同意結論。

這類評語,怎麼說呢?是…
投訴麥記漢堡無肉味,去雲吞麵檔話要鋸扒。

其實這一點我是經常說的:你要知道自己在看甚麼。(適用於電影、小說、漫畫、卡通…)

這一部明擺著就是暑期檔娛樂大片:有明星壓陣,節奏明快緊湊,人物情節簡單易懂,畫面絢麗,動作刺激,目不暇給。最適合一家大細、或三五豬朋狗友,各捧著一大包爆穀、一大杯汽水入場;而腦袋,是應該放在戲院門口,到散場時才領回的。

娛樂了115分鐘,還有甚麼好投訴?不是每一部片都要意味深長,有甚麼微言大義。(呸!)一部片,能有娛樂之功,就是一種成就,不應蔑視。批評一部娛樂電影沒有深度,簡直無稽。

另外,本片有Michael CaineMorgan FreemanMark Ruffalo,已值回票價。

Mélanie LaurentINTERPOL探員… 嗯,對,是沒甚麼發揮的花瓶角色,但實在是恰如其分的花瓶:她在鏡頭前出現本身已令畫面增色不少。(花瓶角色,就是要賞心悅目,這已經夠了;再有額外表現,那是送的。)

==

簡單評分:

A-(☆☆☆☆★)

文抄:Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 505-507 (1969)

「言論自由」的「言論」,是否只限於「文字」?

早陣子看過Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397(請參看舊文:<文抄:Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419-420 (1989)>,意猶未盡,順藤摸瓜,追蹤其思路起源。

先不厭其煩地再從Texas v. Johnson詳引一大段:

“Johnson was convicted of flag desecration for burning the flag rather than for uttering insulting words. 2 This fact somewhat complicates our consideration of his conviction under the First Amendment. We must first determine whether Johnson’s burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment in challenging his conviction. See, e. g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 -411 (1974). If his conduct was expressive, we next decide whether the State’s regulation is related to the suppression of free expression. See, e. g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Spence, supra, at 414, n. 8. If the State’s regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent standard we announced in United States v. O’Brien for regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls. See O’Brien, supra, at 377. If it is, then we are outside of O’Brien‘s test, and we must ask whether this interest justifies Johnson’s conviction under a more demanding standard. 3 See Spence, supra, at 411. A third possibility is that the State’s asserted interest is simply not implicated on these facts, and in that event the interest drops out of the picture. See 418 U.S., at 414 , n. 8.

簡單說,就是要先裁定Johnson「燒國旗」的行為,是否一種「表達(某種訊息)」的行為,然後再視察州政府的法令是否限制其行為,云云。

The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of “speech," but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word. While we have rejected “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea," United States v. O’Brien, supra, at 376, we have acknowledged that conduct may be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments," Spence, supra, at 409.

這段是重中之中。

雖然《憲法第一修正案》在字面上只禁止限制「言論」,但法院早已確立其保障並不限於「口頭或書面字句」。

In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." 418 U.S., at 410 -411. Hence, we have recognized the expressive nature of students’ wearing of black armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969); of a sit-in by blacks in a “whites only" area to protest segregation, Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141 -142 (1966); of the wearing of American military uniforms in a dramatic presentation criticizing American involvement in Vietnam, Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); and of picketing about a wide variety of causes, see, e. g., Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313 -314 (1968); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983).
Especially pertinent to this case are our decisions recognizing the communicative nature of conduct relating to flags. Attaching a peace sign to the flag, Spence, supra, at 409-410; refusing to salute the flag, Barnette, 319 U.S., at 632 ; and displaying a red flag, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-369 (1931), we have held, all may find shelter under the First Amendment. See also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 588 (1974) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment) (treating flag “contemptuously" by wearing pants with small flag sewn into their seat is expressive conduct). That we have had little difficulty identifying an expressive element in conduct relating to flags should not be surprising. The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country; it is, one might say, “the one visible manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood." Id., at 603 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Thus, we have observed:

[‘][T]he flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design.[‘] Barnette, supra, at 632.

Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signifies this Nation as does the combination of letters found in “America."
We have not automatically concluded, however, that any action taken with respect to our flag is expressive. Instead, in characterizing such action for First Amendment purposes, we have considered the context in which it occurred. In Spence, for example, we emphasized that Spence’s taping of a peace sign to his flag was “roughly simultaneous with and concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy." 418 U.S., at 410 . The State of Washington had conceded, in fact, that Spence’s conduct was a form of communication, and we stated that “the State’s concession is inevitable on this record." Id., at 409.

以上一大段,是引用及討論案例。如有興趣,當可一一查看。

The State of Texas conceded for purposes of its oral argument in this case that Johnson’s conduct was expressive conduct, Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, and this concession seems to us as prudent as was Washington’s in Spence. Johnson burned an American flag as part – indeed, as the culmination – of a political demonstration that coincided with the convening of the Republican Party and its renomination of Ronald Reagan for President. The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. At his trial, Johnson explained his reasons for burning the flag as follows: “The American Flag was burned as Ronald Reagan was being renominated as President. And a more powerful statement of symbolic speech, whether you agree with it or not, couldn’t have been made at that time. It’s quite a just position [juxtaposition]. We had new patriotism and no patriotism." 5 Record 656. In these circumstances, Johnson’s burning of the flag was conduct “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication," Spence, 418 U.S., at 409 , to implicate the First Amendment."
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-406 (1989) (Opinion of BRENNAN, J.)

最後裁定:事發當時是一個政治集會,在這情況下「燒國旗」,很明顯是帶有政治色彩的一種表達行為,是一種帶有象徵意味的「言論」。

* * *

引文中提到另一件案:
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)

案件概要如下:
有學生決定戴黑臂章回校,以示反對越戰。此舉違反校規,被停學,直至抗議期完結。後來輾轉打官司至最高法院。

詳情可參看維基,也宜細閱判詞,以下是法官Abe Fortas的判詞摘錄:

“The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was closely akin to “pure speech" which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).

撮寫地方法院的裁斷。簡而言之,是指出「戴臂章」的行為並無任何「擾亂秩序」之處,跡近「純粹的『言論』」,受《憲法第一修正案》保障。

First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), this Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents States from forbidding the teaching of a foreign language to young students. Statutes to this effect, the Court held, unconstitutionally interfere with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent. 2 See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (concurring opinion); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Epperson v. Arkansas, ante, p. 97 (1968).

這是名句出現之段落。

In West Virginia v. Barnette, supra, this Court held that under the First Amendment, the student in public school may not be compelled to salute the flag. Speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson, the Court said:

[‘]The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures – Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.[‘]319 U.S., at 637.

On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools. See Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 104; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 402. Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities."
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 505-507 (1969) (Opinion of FORTAS, J.)

其實我只想舉當中的一句:

「[不論]學生或教師,都沒有在校門前放下言論或表達自由之憲法權利。([neither] students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.)」

這是保障兒童權利的名句,但在本文而言,這一部份尤為重要:「言論或表達自由之憲法權利(constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression)」

所謂「言論」,其實不限於文字,而可引申至各種形式的意見之表達。如果「言論自由(freedom of speech)」不夠清楚,不妨說「表達自由(freedom of expression)」;而究其底蘊,則可說是「思想/意見自由(freedom of thought/opinion)」。

不論以文字、圖像、聲音、雕刻、動作或任何其他形式表達,其實都是將思想和意見形之於外的行為,其意義相當,理應受同樣保障。

此說其實也見於《世界人權宣言(Universal Declaration of Human Rights)》:

「Article 18.
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
第十八條
人人有思想、良心和宗教自由的權利;此項權利包括改變他的宗教或信仰的自由,以及單獨或集體、公開或秘密地以教義、實踐、禮拜或戒律表示他的宗教或信仰的自由。

Article 19.
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
第十九條
人人有權享有主張和發表意見的自由;此項權利包括持有主張而不受干涉的自由,和通過任何媒介和不論國界尋求、接受和傳遞消息和思想的自由。」
英文版:http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
中文版:http://www.un.org/zh/documents/udhr/

如果說:「一種意見以文字表達,受憲法保障;但同一種意見以行動(或其他形式)表達,則不受憲法保障。」這無疑是荒謬的。

文抄:"Don’t turn your back on science: An open letter from biologist Richard Dawkins to Prince Charles", The Observer, 21 May, 2000.

“Next, Sir, I think you may have an exaggerated idea of the natural ness of ‘traditional’ or ‘organic’ agriculture. Agriculture has always been unnatural. Our species began to depart from our natural hunter-gatherer lifestyle as recently as 10,000 years ago – too short to measure on the evolutionary timescale.
Wheat, be it ever so wholemeal and stoneground, is not a natural food for Homo sapiens. Nor is milk, except for children. Almost every morsel of our food is genetically modified – admittedly by artificial selection not artificial mutation, but the end result is the same. A wheat grain is a genetically modified grass seed, just as a pekinese is a genetically modified wolf. Playing God? We’ve been playing God for centuries!
The large, anonymous crowds in which we now teem began with the agricultural revolution, and without agriculture we could survive in only a tiny fraction of our current numbers. Our high population is an agricultural (and technological and medical) artifact. It is far more unnatural than the population-limiting methods condemned as unnatural by the Pope. Like it or not, we are stuck with agriculture, and agriculture – all agriculture – is unnatural. We sold that pass 10,000 years ago."
Dawkins, Richard, “Don’t turn your back on science: An open letter from biologist Richard Dawkins to Prince Charles", The Observer, 21 May, 2000. retrieved from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2000/may/21/gm.food1

早陣子看到消委會說基因改造食物(GM food),隨手寫了一篇。
(請參看舊文:<科學怪粟(?)>

今日剛好看到一篇文,題為<Richard Dawkins談基因改造作物(Richard Dawkins talks about GMO crops)>。一讀,原來是引用一篇十三年前的舊文!

有幾樣重大發現:
 一、 我之前肯定沒有讀過這篇文。
    (肯定我上一篇說GM food時沒有「抄考」。)
 二、 我的看法很相似。
    (雖然我寫得沒那麼好。)
    (這是新聞嗎?)
 三、 輿論在十三年間沒進步過!
    (失望。不過也不是新聞了。)

十三年前,應該還是中學時候。那時候,我應該剛看過《自私的基因(The Selfish Gene》,究竟懂得多少?不好說。肯定不算透徹吧。

後來,他的書也越看越多。(說「多」,其實總共也不是很多本。)究竟受到多少影響?不知道。很多罷。對我思想影響最深者,Richard Dawkins必入三甲。

《擬似主角(Reality)》

'Reality' film poster
(from Wikipedia;Fair Use/Fair Dealing)

話先說在前頭,其實本片我不太喜歡。有些部份很貼近現實,但有些部份(尤其初段)又拍得很奇幻,而整體而言,感覺不到這些「風格切換」有甚麼需要。節奏很奇怪:有些瑣事拖得很長,有時候又忽然跳轉得很急;感覺像在「大塞車」的公路上,不停胡亂試圖「切線爬頭」,但很快又要停低,然後在無關痛癢之處浪費時間;開場不到一小時,我已頻頻看錶。

不過,這套片某部份主題可作談資,感覺不妨寫兩筆。又,搜尋後再發現本片有若干有趣之處,也可整理一下。

老實說,事前沒怎留意過這部戲,也不知道是說甚麼的,不過見當日有少許空檔時間,就不妨入場看套戲。(入場前只見過海報,還以為是科幻片…)剛剛才知道,原來是2012年康城影展評審團獎得獎作品,真是有眼不識泰山。

(所謂「評審團獎(Grand Prix)」,直譯其實是「大獎」,不過… 實際上是「二獎」;真正的「大獎」是「金棕櫚獎(Palme d’Or;Golden Palm)」,2012年得獎作是《愛(Amour》。這些獎項的名稱真麻煩,怎麼不叫「首/大獎」、「二獎」、「三獎」… 更簡單易明嘛!其實可能都是宣傳技倆,因為電影公司都希望作品得的獎夠好聽。)

說起來,本片導演Matteo Garrone跟這個「二獎」真有緣份。上一套作品《我在娥摩拉的日子(Gomorrah》,在2008年康城影展也是得了個「二獎」。

而更有趣者,是關於男主角Aniello Arena。

導演上一套電影《我在娥摩拉的日子(Gomorrah)》是關於「Camorra(一種源流久遠的意大利黑幫。)」;而本片的男主角Aniello,就曾經是Camorra成員,而且在1991年謀殺罪成,被判終身監禁,不得假釋。

由於他身份特殊,所以也引來不少報導,我看了兩篇訪問:
Ed Vulliamy, “Aniello Arena: the Italian gangster who turned movie star", The Observer, 17 February, 2013.
Lily Rothman, “Prison Break: A Q&A with Reality Star Aniello Arena", TIME, 15 March, 2013.
(懶得寫撮要,還是貼上連結,由讀者自行參閱吧。)

香港人最感到匪夷所思的一點,應該是這「殺人犯(他被定罪,但堅稱無辜。)」怎麼能出獄拍戲。據他自己講述,原來在獄中行為良好,即使他是不得假釋的終身囚犯,仍可以申請外出工作。除了今次拍電影,他平日也獲批准到附近(甚至意大利境內其他城市)排練/演舞台劇,跟一般演員差別不大,唯晚上要回到監獄掛單而已。

這樣的安排是好是壞,一時之間我也說不出甚麼意見:囚犯被剝奪若干自由,以作懲罰、警戒,這似是理所當然,但囚犯仍有人應當有的基本權利,這權利是否包括(在監管下)外出工作?這問題很難答。

,「終身監禁」其實是一種「不定刑期」的懲罰,如果撇開所有假釋安排,這是一種刑期很飄忽的刑罰。夭壽跟長壽,刑期差別很大。犯案時年輕或年長,刑期差別也很大。而「沒有確實刑期」,本身也是額外的心理壓力、懲罰。容許他們有限度外出,或也是一種補救方法。當然,也可以用「確實刑期」作替代。又是一道不易答的問題。

越扯越遠。

回到電影吧。

男主角希望參加意大利版的《老大哥(Big Brother》真人騷節目--《Grande Fratello》。試鏡後,一直發白日夢,後來生活起連串變化。

看的時候,立刻想起另一部戲--《真人Show(The Truman Show》。在《真人Show》,占基利(Jim Carrey)知道自己是真人騷主角後,想要走出去。這次的男主角,已有其生活,卻想走進去。不過,兩者相似(/相異)之處並不止於此。

在《真人Show》當中,那種仿宗教意像是頗為著跡的。節目的監製就如「神」一樣,掌控一切,以各種「天然(其實人工)」障礙阻止占基利出走。而占基利,最終見到節目監製,選擇不要假象,選擇過真實的人生。不過,如果剝走這層外衣,也不過是一個「英雄之旅」的故事而已;是關係個人成長,多於關於世界/宇宙/宗教觀的故事。

而這部戲,是剛好相反的。

與其說這是一個「小人物生活悲喜劇」的故事,倒不如說是諷刺宗教迷信的故事。

劇透警告!!!劇透警告!!!劇透警告!!!

劇透警告!!!劇透警告!!!劇透警告!!!

劇透警告!!!劇透警告!!!劇透警告!!!

戲中至少有兩處,是其為諷刺劇的線索:
一、 主角在魚檔趕走一窮漢後,懊悔不已,認為窮漢是電視台派去試探他的。
其伙記後來跟主角說:「神無時無刻都在監視世人。」
二、 電影初段,有一幕是到教堂尋人,其行可見主角並不虔誠。
(不敢說他不信,證據不明確,但肯定非虔誠信徒。)
而後來,主角越來越瘋狂,其妻及伙記,就試圖用宗教「拯救」主角。
最終,當然不成功。
(我認為尚有其他蛛絲馬跡,但此兩處明顯之餘,劇透不算太嚴重。)

甚麼是「善」?
甚麼是「善心」、「善行」?
因為「怕被懲罰而行善」是否「善」?
而「人之為善」,是因為相信「舉頭三尺有神明」嗎?
而如果,主角因為相信電視台派人監視而行善是「瘋狂」
教徒因為相信「舉頭三尺有神明」/「因果報應」而行善,
不也是同樣(或更)「瘋狂」嗎?

(之所以可能是「更瘋狂」,是因為我們有充分證據相信「電視台存在」,但沒有任何理由相信「神」、「報應」… 存在。所以,「電視台派人監視」,其實是遠比「舉頭三尺有神明」合理可信的。)

《老大哥》節目的參賽者,因為要取悅觀眾,以求勝出比賽,可能會做這樣那樣的事。亦因為如此,我們有很強的理由認為他們在節目上的言行未必真心。推而廣之,如果教徒是相信「舉頭三尺有神明」,其用心許亦跟《老大哥》參賽者相去不遠。

噢,別誤會。我相信「行動」遠比「心意」有意義。(也只有「行動」可以比較/實證,「心意」不過是口頭說說而已,沒意思的。)不過,這類比可明白指出,相信「舉頭三尺有神明」而行善,其實只是一種「虛情假意」,沒甚麼優越的。

而再推遠一點。「相信電視台派員監視」,其實也不比「相信有神」、「相信有神監視世人」荒謬。(起碼,我們很確實有電視台存在。)男主角沉溺於《老大哥》節目的幻想,其實不比沉溺任何迷信、任何宗教更荒謬。所以,為甚麼宗教不能「拯救」主角?因為他已有其宗教信仰(《老大哥》節目)。

妄想用一種迷信取代另一種迷信,根本沒意思。

現實是,就我們所知,眼前的世界就是所有。任何宗教,其實同樣迷信、同樣瘋狂。唯一合理的處世之道,是過好眼前的生活,關顧現實的世界。所有「超自然」信仰,皆是虛妄。

==

簡單評分:

C+(☆☆☆)

'Reality' film poster
(from Wikipedia;Fair Use/Fair Dealing)
另一款海報。
我比較喜歡這款。

《企業殺手(회사원)[A Company Man]》

A Company Man Poster
(from Wikipedia;Fair Use/Fair Dealing)

雖然有我喜歡的韓片,但總括而言並不太喜歡韓片,對現時蔚為「瘋」潮的韓流也頗不以為然;這是我很少寫韓片的背景,但我相信要寫的話,評語也是大致中肯的。

對,這次是一套韓片。雖然我完全不懂韓文,但直覺認為… 英文片名應該較貼近原文。

 (香港譯名通常都浮誇一點,也有點「意味不明」。
  「企業殺手」,究竟是以下哪一種(?):
   [1]、殺「企業」的「殺手」;
   [2]、為「企業」去「殺人/殺企業」的「殺手」;
   [3]、一間「殺手企業」內工作的「殺手」。)

卒之,根據維基大神的解釋,原來韓文片名的「회사원」可以寫成漢字--「會社員」。

哦!立刻就明白了。就大概等如日文的「会社員」吧。
其實就是指「サラリーマン(salaryman;上班族)」。

結果原來是[3]:「一個企業化的殺手集團內工作的上班族殺手。」
(噢,剛好有部日文漫畫的中文名叫《上班族殺手》,原文叫《今日からヒットマン》。
 [聽起來真像《今日開始是魔王》…]
 不過兩者應該毫無關係,從簡介得知,兩者情景也不相似。)

這個情景設定,本應是最有趣的賣點,也是全套戲最新穎的點子,但很可惜,只佔本片一小部份。(大概兩成多吧。)一間「殺手企業」究竟是怎樣運作,有甚麼企業文化/特點,上班的人生活如何(是否如普通人一樣呢?),計劃詳情如何安排(片中只草草交代),都很有趣,也有發展潛力,浪費了。(倒不如我試著自己寫吧,哈哈。)

片中的殺手,生活就像--殺手

主角的生活,跟一般電影/小說的殺手(或黑社會)形象沒太大差別,甚至頗為典型

而故事… 這麼說吧:有看過八、九十年代的港產黑幫/殺手片嗎?就是那種… 因某種契機(通常都是女人[沒有偏見,純粹是因為大多數故事都是由異性戀男子當黑幫/殺手主角]),期後或良心發現、或厭倦此生活等等,想金盆洗手… 結果不問可知,看慣了都知道是同一套路,只不過那幾種變化。(今次,維基上的簡介不詳盡,也不算太準確;但無論如何,看或不看都沒甚麼差別。)

(其實由《獨行殺手(Le Samouraï》,到《喋血雙雄》,到《這個殺手不太冷(Léon: The Professional》… 或無數其他例子。殺手的故事不少都是大同小異。)

這一個環節,拍得還不錯,就像「純愛片」那樣吧,也都是韓片拿手的。

「殺手片」也不能沒有動作吧。還不錯。尤其是… 「密室/類密室」那些拍得好,人較少的拍得較好。群戰拍得普通。另外,本應是高潮位那一串鎗戰,太粗糙,令人失望。(不算劇透吧,反正大家都預料會有的。)

如此只是這樣,那就不用浪費時間寫甚麼屁文了。雖然,挖得不夠深入,發展得不夠廣,白白浪費了有趣的背景,但精彩之處,還是在設定之中。

主角的會社生活,零星散落在整部戲,而尾段有幾句對白,如果將其從「上班族/打工仔電影」角度看,就比較有趣味。就是說:如果,他不是對殺手生活感到厭倦,而是對「工作」(枯燥、重複)厭倦?如果… 他真的只是個普通打工仔?

有被隨便開除、裁減的兼職員工。
有不知怎過退休生活的老人。
有無能又麻煩的上司。(很典型的形象。)
有城府深扮好人的大老闆。

..

其實這可以是每一個打工仔的故事。
(當然,少一點拳腳、少一點子彈、少一點血。)

頗有趣。

還是那一句,我只婉惜這部份拍得不夠深入。

==

簡單評分:

B-(☆☆☆☆)

文抄:Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419-420 (1989)

這一單案叫Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397

長話短說:
 1984年,Gregory Lee Johnson在德州焚燒美國國旗。
 被捕、被控,定罪後被罰。
 後不服定罪,輾轉上訴至美國最高法院
 最終,在1989年,法院以5-4裁定:
  燒國旗是受憲法第一修正案保護的自由言論。

以下引述的,是開明派法官William J. Brennan, Jr.判詞的一部份。

The way to preserve the flag’s special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong.

[‘]To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.[‘]

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). And, precisely because it is our flag that is involved, one’s response to the flag burner may exploit the uniquely persuasive power of the flag itself. We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one’s own, no better way to counter a flag burner’s message than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by – as one witness here did – according its remains a respectful burial. We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents."
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419-420 (1989) (Opinion of BRENNAN, J.)

州法例被推翻了,但保守派不會這麼輕易死心。
後來通過了《Flag Protection Act of 1989》,修改聯邦法例。
結果,另一件案再打到最高法院:United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
法院再次以5-4比數,確認保護言論自由更重要。

We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to many. But the same might be said, for example, of virulent ethnic and religious epithets, see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), vulgar repudiations of the draft, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and scurrilous caricatures, see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). [‘]If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.[‘] Johnson, supra, at 414. Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering."
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-319 (1990) (Opinion of BRENNAN, J.)

其實,我從根本上就不認同「愛國」、「愛團體」的概念,而對任何「旗幟」、「徽號」,也從不認為有甚麼需要尊重,但這一點並不重要。
(簡單說幾句。「國家」、「政府」是有用的概念、制度、工具,但也僅此而已。你會不會「愛螺絲批」、「愛原子筆」、「愛殺蟲水」?那是工具而已!有用的工具,我們會愛惜,這是好事,但也僅此而已。不要跟工具談戀愛。而工具不好使、老舊、陳腐,那是隨時可以丟棄的。)

就算假設一個「符號」是值得尊重、應該尊重,並不表示我們可以懲罰那些侮蔑這個「符號」的人。你有權利尊重一個「符號」,我也有同等的權利蔑視同一個「符號」。

其實這正是我常說的:
 言論(思想)自由,並不是「尊重不同的想法」,而是--
  「尊重每人能有不同想法的權利」
(如果言論自由是「要尊重不同的想法」,那不就沒有「蔑視另一種想法」的權利/自由了嗎?這顯然不對。)