「對,XX是我殺的。」(嗎?)

凶手自白:「對,XX是我殺的。」

如果是推理小說,犯人被偵探揭破詭計後,通常都會認輸自白。按不同故事類型,可能也會有「真情剖白」環節。然後,可能會自殺(例如:《犬神家の一族》中的… 凶手。[這麼輕微地爆料就放過我吧…]),也有的會移送法辦(當然是刑警類型小說的首選。)。既然犯人都自白了,讀者當然心滿意足。(除非發現手中小說只過了一半,那當然代表事有蹺蹊,真凶可能另有其人,又或背後另有隱情。)

不過,小說歸小說,犯人的自白(Confession),可不是這麼隨便的事情。

「自白」,向來都是將疑犯入罪的利器:「疑犯自己都招認了,還有甚麼好爭辯的呢?」

之所以,從小看古裝片,中國古代奸官酷吏都有將犯人「屈打成招」的傳統。甚麼「拶指(夾手指)」、「夾棍(夾腿)」,都是看古裝片常見的。

(話分兩頭,「拶」、「夾」,理論上是較重的逼供方法,不是查一般鼠竊狗偷案件可以用的。見:

「《大清律例‧刑律‧斷獄上》有關「不合拷訊者」的規定同於《大明律》。清律規定訊囚用杖每日不過三十,但「熱審得用掌嘴、跪鍊等刑,強盜人命酌用夾棍,婦人拶指,通不得過二次。」 刑訊除了用杖外,尚有掌嘴、跪鍊、夾棍、拶指等。特別是夾拶為刑之極重者,不得輕用,而且只有三法司、督撫、按察使、正印官得以酌用夾棍,其餘大小衙門不許擅用。」
陳俊強 1999/01,〈刑訊制度〉,收入高明士主編《唐律與國家社會研究》台北:五南圖書,頁403~437。作者網址:http://web.ntpu.edu.tw/~chanck/

 該文有趣,讀者宜參看。)

時至今日,我們當然不容這種取證方法。

如果有看美國警匪片,必然聽過一段非常有名的警誡詞--「Miranda Warning」,大致相當於港產警匪片中會聽到的「唔係事必要你講」警誡詞。

這段說話,其實源於一件案Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

時任首席大法官Earl Warren撰寫的判詞很精彩,我摘錄了一部份附於文後[注1]

簡單來說,Earl Warren認為憲法第五修正案所保障的,是非常根本且重要的憲法權利;任何人,都不應因為對法律無知、沒有能力徵詢法律意見等原因,而被剝奪或削弱這權利。(當然,憲法第五修正案所保障的權利不僅「免於自我入罪」的權利,但本案的重點則在於此。)

故此,法院要求執法人員向疑犯問話前,要警告疑犯:可行使「保持緘默(Right to silence)」的權利,並可要求律師陪同,如果無能力聘請律師,則可獲委派律師。

不過,要求執法人員警誡疑犯並不是新鮮事。早在1912年,英國就有一份叫《Judges’ Rules》的指引,都有類近的要求。要求執法者(或所有公權力/機關)對待疑犯時,要遵循正常(法律)程序(Due Process),當然比古代的嚴刑逼供進步得多,也體現了社會對人權日益重視、尊重。

然而,我所想的,是我們能否再進一步?

第一點,當然是「自白/招供」的內在風險。

就算有多重的制度保障,制度仍有可能出錯、也可能被扭曲、也會有各種不幸或不當的因素影響,而導致「虛假招認(False Confession)」。維基頁的資料很詳盡,我或不花太多筆墨重複抄寫。

簡單而言,就算執法人員完全依足指引,在盤問時仍可用不同技巧,對疑犯施以心理壓力,令無辜的人也可能「自願招認」。比如一種北美執法人員常用的Reid Technique,就被評有此風險,甚至有電視紀錄片探討過這問題。

Innocence Project統計,在他們經手處理的冤案當中,有達四份一曾作過「虛假招認」或「令自己入罪的供詞」。讀者可到該計劃的網頁詳看。

另外一種問話技倆稱為「Bluff Technique」。問話者向疑犯謊稱已握有證據,但不明確表示究竟是可令疑犯入罪或脫罪的證據。聽起來似乎不壞,但研究發現,即使是這種看似無害的技倆,其實也很可能令無辜者「招認」。(見:Jennifer T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin. “Inside interrogation: The lie, the bluff, and false confessions," Law and Human Behavior, Vol 35(4), Aug 2011, 327-337. doi: 10.1007/s10979-010-9244-2

第二點,其實向疑犯問話,其後以此為檢控之證據,本身是否已經不公平?

試想像一個被捕人,無論他/她實際上是無辜或有罪也好,被拘捕、被扣留、被問話,必然是一個令人緊張、徬徨的狀況;在這情況下所作的決定,其實很難令人衷心信服是經深思熟慮的「自願」行為,多少都有受當時的環境所催逼。

就算被捕人是真正的犯人,所作的招認內容都真確無誤,但究竟是當時的環境令他招認,還是他/她在正常情況底下、在一般的精神狀況底下,都會作出同樣的「自願」選擇?其實疑犯「事後反悔」,想推翻之前所說的口供,本身已令人懷疑所謂「自願」(即使沒有其他威嚇、壓迫)的程度有多少。

如果某疑犯原來是真正的犯人,也有心招認,有心承擔罪責,在案件後續的任何階段,也可以認罪。無論有沒有疑犯的招認,這一點應該沒甚麼影響。為甚麼要依賴「自白/招認」這種不可靠的證據?

從保障人權的角度看,其實是否應該廢止「自白/招認」作為檢控證據?

我未有肯定的看法,但傾向贊成不再依賴「自白/招認」。

--

注1:

“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it – the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator’s imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury. Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.

The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.

The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system – that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.

The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claim that the admonishment of the right to remain silent without more “will benefit only the recidivist and the professional." Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae, p. 14. Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 , n. 5. Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.

The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443 -448 (1958) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).

An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs counsel. As the California Supreme Court has aptly put it:

“Finally, we must recognize that the imposition of the requirement for the request would discriminate against the defendant who does not know his rights. The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant who most needs counsel. We cannot penalize a defendant who, not understanding his constitutional rights, does not make the formal request and by such failure demonstrates his helplessness. To require the request would be to favor the defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously prompted him to make it." People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351, 398 P.2d 361, 369-370, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177-178 (1965) (Tobriner, J.).

In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962), we stated: “[I]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request." This proposition applies with equal force in the context of providing counsel to protect an accused’s Fifth Amendment privilege in the face of interrogation. Although the role of counsel at trial differs from the role during interrogation, the differences are not relevant to the question whether a request is a prerequisite.

Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead: Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.

If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. The financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as the affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who can retain an attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance. The cases before us as well as the vast majority of confession cases with which we have dealt in the past involve those unable to retain counsel. While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice. Denial of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation at trial and on appeal struck down in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent – the person most often subjected to interrogation – the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it.

Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.

This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a “station house lawyer" present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-474 (1966) (Opinion of WARREN, J.)

One thought on “「對,XX是我殺的。」(嗎?)”

發表迴響

在下方填入你的資料或按右方圖示以社群網站登入:

WordPress.com Logo

您的留言將使用 WordPress.com 帳號。 登出 / 變更 )

Twitter picture

您的留言將使用 Twitter 帳號。 登出 / 變更 )

Facebook照片

您的留言將使用 Facebook 帳號。 登出 / 變更 )

Google+ photo

您的留言將使用 Google+ 帳號。 登出 / 變更 )

連結到 %s