整部戲，僅得兩處不滿：其一是無厘頭醜化國家運輸安全委員會（National Transportation Safety Board，NTSB）為一群愚昧陰險小人，其二是臨近尾聲時Aaron Eckhart那句故作懶風趣的對白（「［若要重做一次在水面降落之舉，］我會選擇在七月做。」）實在惡頂。
“When asked about training for ditching, he said they got familiarization with the QRH. He said he thought that was something that was difficult to practice and he did not recall it in simulator.
When asked about guidance for ditching in company manuals, he said there were things in the manuals about that. He said it was a dichotomy between planned and unplanned landings. He said if it was timed and they could prepare, there was guidance. He said notification, prepare the cabin, direction of landing, wind and sea states, airplane configuration, and land near vessels. He said yes, there was guidance in the manuals about that.
When asked if anything from training was helpful in the current situation, he said “absolutely training has helped”. He said he was trained on fundamental values to maintain aircraft control, manage the situation, and land as soon as the situation permits. He said training on CRM, clear definition of duties, and clear communications of plan and to where headed. He also said the basic rules of airmanship and CRM helped. He said what they learned in training and procedures on aircraft from airbus. He said all they learned in some way contributed to this."
（見：National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), “Operations/Human Performance Group Chairmen Interview summaries – Flight crew", p. 13, http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/47000-47499/47230/418999.pdf。）
“…In these scenarios, the turn towards the airport following the bird strike was immediate in order to determine, from an aerodynamic point of view, whether the airplane had the performance to glide to a runway from the bird strike location. The immediate turn does not reflect or account for real-world considerations such as the time delay required to recognize the bird strike, and decide on a course of action. These factors are considered in Conditions 2.2c and 2.3c by incorporating a 35-second delay prior to the turn towards the airport." (emphasis added)
（見：NTSB, “Simulator Evaluations for US Airways A320 Flight 1549 Accident, Ditching in Hudson River, 1/15/09 (NTSB # DCA09MA026)", p. 3, http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/47000-47499/47230/420152.pdf。）
“A total of 20 runs were performed in the S22 simulator in which pilots attempted to return to LGA runways 13 or 22, or attempted to land at TEB runway 19. Five of 20 runs (25%) were discarded due to poor data or simulator malfunctions, leaving 15 runs for analysis (6 runs to LGA runway 22, 7 runs to LGA runway 13, and 2 runs to TEB runway 19). Eight of 15 runs (53%) made successful landings. The 8 successful runs were made following an immediate turn to an airport after the bird strike. See Table 1 for details of each run.
Specifically, six runs were made to return to LGA runway 22 immediately following the bird strike. Of those six, two (33%) resulted in a successful runway landing – one using flaps at the pilot’s discretion (condition 2.1a; one additional attempt was unsuccessful) and one using slats only (condition 2.1b; four additional attempts were unsuccessful). Due to inadequate successful landing attempts following an immediate turn after the bird strike, attempts to land at LGA runway 22 after a 35 second delay (condition 2.1c) were not performed.
Additionally, pilots attempted to land at LGA on runway 13. All four pilots successfully landed (100%) on LGA runway 13 following an immediate left turn to the airport following the bird strike (condition 2.2a). Two runs were attempted in which the pilot was required to use slats only on landing on runway 13 (condition 2.2b). One landing (50%) was successful and one landing was not successful, requiring the pilot to ditch in the waters adjacent to LGA. The one attempt to return to LGA runway 13 following a 35 second delay (condition 2.2c) was not successful. No additional attempts were made to return to LGA runway 13.
Finally, two runs were attempted to determine the ability of the airplane to land at TEB runway 19 immediately after the bird strike. In both runs, pilots were able to use flaps at their discretion (condition 2.3a). One attempt (50%) was successful and one attempt was unsuccessful. Due to inadequate successful landing attempts following an immediate turn, conditions 2.3b and 2.3c were not attempted." (emphasis added)
（見：NTSB, “Simulator Evaluations for US Airways A320 Flight 1549 Accident, Ditching in Hudson River, 1/15/09 (NTSB # DCA09MA026)", pp. 6-7。）
主持聽證會的Robert L. Sumwalt，非但無在會上質疑Sully，反而… 我本來想講「去片」，但錄影實在太長，不如讀謄本快捷，就來看他如何問Sully（摘錄）：
“CHAIRMAN SUMWALT: This event turned out differently than a lot of the situations the Board looks at. Tell me, in your mind, what made the critical difference in this event? How did this event turn out so well compared to, perhaps, other events that we see at the Safety Board?"（p. 46, lines 17-21）
“CHAIRMAN SUMWALT: You testified to Congress — you and I testified on the same day back in February, and you mentioned that the airline piloting profession faces some challenges. I want to make sure — unfortunately, we, at the Board, we see events that don’t have, oftentimes, good outcomes, so what can we extract from your mindset, from the things you’ve learned, to basically hand over to others in your profession?"（pp. 47-48, lines 21-25 & 1-2）
“CHAIRMAN SUMWALT: Thank you. In looking at the CVR transcript and listening, actually, to the CVR, I noticed that you immediately, after both engines were lost, you immediately turned on the ignition; you fairly much immediately started the APU and then commanded for the loss of both engines checklist. Oftentimes — and we may even get some testimony on this later this morning or later today — oftentimes, when somebody is faced with an unusual or surprising situation, there’s a choke factor, there’s a startle response. You did not seem to exhibit that startle response. It was like you knew, you were prepared for this, you knew immediately what to do. What do you attribute that to?"（pp. 49-50, lines 18-25 & 1-4）
“CHAIRMAN SUMWALT: And I think that is so important. I’m trying to get an idea of what your mindset is and how you were there. I can contrast you to a crew that we looked at recently that I mentioned the captain said he was ambivalent. They had an engine fire 800 feet AGL and it took about three and a half minutes before they completed the checklist, which should be a memory item, should be done immediately. So I want to be able to bottle your mindset and be able to make sure that everybody is drinking from that same bottle.
As far as the CRM, and the Threat and Error Management is concerned, what can we learn from your lessons regarding — from CRM and Threat and Error Management?"（p. 50, lines 12-23）
（見：NTSB, “Transcript – Public Hearing Day 1 (06/09/09)", http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/47000-47499/47230/422295.pdf。）
“CAPT. SULLENBERGER: Well, if you think I wasn’t startled, you misunderstand. But I think both Jeff Skiles and I have done this long enough and trained long enough to have internalized the values of our profession and to have learned what needs to be done, and so we quickly acknowledged our bodies’ innate physiological reactions, set it aside and began to work on the task at hand."
（見：NTSB, “Transcript – Public Hearing Day 1 (06/09/09)", p. 50, lines 5-11。）
“Captain Sullenberger said he “could not be more happy and pleased and gratified that we got 155 people off the airplane and it was due to the professionalism of my crew; Jeff, Donna, Sheila, and Doreen”."
（見：NTSB, “Operations/Human Performance Group Chairmen Interview summaries – Flight crew", p. 21。）